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Abstract—We show that for a legitimate communication under
multipath quasi-static fading with a reduced number of scatter-
ers, it is possible to achieve perfect secrecy even in the presence of
a passive eavesdropper for which no channel state information
is available. Specifically, we show that the outage probability
of secrecy capacity (OPSC) is zero for a given range of average
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the legitimate and eavesdropper’s
receivers. As an application example, we analyze the OPSC for
the case of two scatterers, explicitly deriving the relationship
between the average SNRs, the secrecy rate RS and the fading
model parameters required for achieving perfect secrecy. The
impact of increasing the number of scatterers is also analyzed,
showing that it is always possible to achieve perfect secrecy in
this scenario, provided that the dominant specular component
for the legitimate channel is sufficiently large compared to the
remaining scattered waves.
Index Terms—Fading channels, outage probability, physical
layer security, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the seminal works in [1–3] have boosted
the interest of the research community for providing secure
communications over wireless channels from an information-
theoretic viewpoint based on the classical work by Shannon
[4]. Compared to the case on which fading is neglected [5, 6],
the effect of random fluctuations due to fading turns out being
beneficial in many cases. For instance, secure communications
are possible even when the legitimate receiver experiences a
lower average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the eavesdrop-
per; in other circumstances, the secrecy capacity under fading
may be larger than its additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
counterpart. In those cases on which channel state information
of the eavesdropper is unknown at the legitimate transmitter,
these previous works [1–3] show that it is not possible to
ensure perfect secrecy, and only a probabilistic measure of
secrecy is available through the outage probability of secrecy
capacity (OPSC) [1].
The field of wireless physical layer security (PLS) has now
become a rather mature field and numerous works have been
devoted to characterize the key performance metrics under
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different propagation conditions [7–9]. Classically, state-of-
the-art fading models like those considered in [1–3] are based
on the central limit theorem (CLT) assumption. This gives rise
to the Rician and Rayleigh models, or generalizations of these
[10–12]. The presence of a diffusely propagating component
arising from the superposition of a sufficiently large number of
non-dominant received waves is common to all these models.
In a way, the CLT provides an approximate solution to the sum
of random phase vectors, which is one of the key problems in
communication theory [13–15].
Nowadays, because of the new use cases of wireless sys-
tems under the umbrella of 5G and its evolutions, there are
several examples on which the propagation conditions may
be substantially different to those predicted by state-of-the-art
fading models. For instance, in mmWave communications a
scarce number of multipath components arrives at the receiver
[16], so that diffuse scattering only becomes relevant when
non-line-of-sight (NLoS) conditions are considered [17]. In
a different context, the potential of large-intelligent surfaces
(LIS) [18] to design the amplitude and phases of the scattered
waves in order to optimize system performance can also be
translated into a superposition of a finite number of individual
waves.
Due to the great deal of attention received by these afore-
mentioned emerging scenarios, we revisit in this work the issue
of secure communications over wireless channels, with one
key question in mind: What’s the effect of considering a finite
number of scatterers on wireless physical layer security? For
the first time in the literature, we demonstrate that it is possible
to achieve perfect secrecy for the communication between two
legitimate peers under multipath quasi-static fading, i.e, zero
OPSC, as the number of scatterers is reduced. We determine
the conditions on which perfect secrecy can be ensured, and
then we give some practical examples using a ray-based fading
model with an increasing number of scattered waves. We
also observe that using the alternative definition of OPSC in
[19], which, in contrast to those in [1–3], only accounts for
outage events that actually compromise the security of the
communication, secrecy performance can be further improved.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The
system model for PLS over fading channels with a finite
number of rays is formulated in Section II. Then, the notion of
perfect secrecy over ray-based fading channels is introduced
in Section III. As an illustrative example, the two-ray case
is analyzed in Sections IV and V, showing how secure and
reliable transmission can be attained. The effect of considering
a larger number of rays is analyzed in Section VI, whereas
main conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
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2II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System model for PLS
We consider a legitimate user (Alice) who wants to send
confidential messages to another user (Bob) in the presence
of an eavesdropper (Eve). For simplicity, yet without loss of
generality, all these agents are equipped with single-antenna
devices. The complex channel gains from Alice to Bob and
Eve are denoted by hb and he, respectively, and assumed
constant during the transmission of an entire codeword but
independent from one codeword to the next one, i.e. we con-
sider quasi-static fading channels. Therefore, the instantaneous
SNRs at Bob and Eve are given by
γb = γb
‖hb‖2
E[‖h2b‖]
, γe = γe
‖he‖2
E[‖h2e‖]
, (1)
where E[·] is the expectation operator and γb and γe denote
the average SNR at Bob and Eve, respectively.
If Alice has perfect knowledge of both Bob’s and Eve’s
instantaneous channel state information (CSI), perfect secrecy
can be obtained by adapting the transmision rate, Rs, in those
instants where γb > γe [1, 3]. The secrecy capacity, i.e., the
maximum transmission rate ensuring a secure communication
between Alice and Bob, is obtained by leveraging the classical
results over real Gaussian channels in [5, 6] to model complex
ones, leading to1
Cs = [Cb − Ce]+ = [log(1 + γb)− log(1 + γe)]+, (2)
where Cb and Ce are the capacities of Bob and Eve, respec-
tively, and [x]+ is the shorthand notation for max{0, x} . Thus,
for each channel realization, Alice would transmit at a rate
Rs ≤ Cs in order to avoid any information leakage to Eve.
Consider now a more realistic case in which Eve’s instan-
taneous CSI is unknown at the transmitter (corresponding,
e.g., to that of a purely passive eavesdropper). In this case,
previous works state that perfect secrecy cannot be achieved,
and therefore they resort on outage analysis [1–3, 19]. That
is, Alice would blindly establish a target transmission rate,
Rs, relying on the assumption that the secrecy capacity of
the channel is larger than Rs. If Cs < Rs, then an outage
occurs and the security of the tranmission is compromised
with some probability. The interest lies then in the analysis of
the probability of such event, namely OPSC, and defined as
[1, 19]
Pout(Rs) , P{Cs < Rs}. (3)
However, all the aforementioned works consider that chan-
nel gains and, consequently, γb and γe, are distributed accord-
ing to classical fading models arising from the assumption
of CLT, which may not be suitable to characterize channel
conditions in some emerging scenarios such as mmWave
communications or propagation through LIS [16, 17]. Because
of the capital importance of the SNRs distributions in the
outage analysis, in the next section we investigate the impact
of ray-based models in the OPSC, proving that it is possible
to achieve perfect secrecy even when Eve’s CSI remains
unknown at the transmitter.
1Unless specifically stated, all the logarithmic functions in this paper are
base 2.
B. CLT and ray-based fading models
Due to the multipath propagation, the complex based-band
received signal is written as the superposition of multiple
waves arising from reflections and scattering as [10, eq. (1)]
h =
N∑
i=1
Vie
jφi (4)
where N denotes the number of multipath waves, Vi ∈ R+
their constant amplitudes and φ their phases, which are as-
sumed to be statistically independent and uniformly distributed
over [0, 2pi). Traditionally, the sum in (4) is split into two
groups of waves as
h =
M∑
i=1
Vie
jφi +
P∑
i=1
V̂ie
jθi (5)
where θi ∀ i are also independent and uniformly distributed.
Hence, the first sum represents the contribution of the M
dominant or specular components, whilst the second one
groups the contribution of non-specular or diffuse waves,
where the power of each component is considerably lower.
Thus, the dominant waves are associated with the line-of-
sight (LoS) components, whereas the diffuse part represents
the contribution of reflections and scattering. When P is
sufficiently large, i.e., we have a rich multipath propagation,
the diffuse component can be regarded as Gaussian because
of the CLT, and therefore
h =
M∑
i=1
Vie
jφi + σxX + jσyY (6)
with X,Y ∼ N (0, 1).
Equation (6) is the basis for most popular fading models,
and the widespread classical distributions arise depending on
the value of the parameters M , σx and σy . For instance, if
σx = σy and M = 0 we obtain the Rayleigh model, whilst
M = 1 yields the Rice distribution and M = 2 reduces to
the two-wave with diffuse power (TWDP) distribution [10].
In this work, we will stick to the general formulation in (4)
in order to explicitly account for the effect of considering a
finite number of multipath waves on PLS.
III. PERFECT SECRECY OVER FADING CHANNELS
A. Impact of a reduced number of scatterers in OPSC
In order to better understand the influence of the fading
distribution in the OPSC, we reformulate Pout in (3) in terms
of Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs as
Pout(Rs) = P{γb < 2Rsγe + 2Rs − 1} = P{γb < γeq}, (7)
which is obtained by introducing (2) in (3) and performing
some basic algebraic manipulations. Note that, when condi-
tioning on γe, Pout corresponds to the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of γb and, therefore, it can be computed by
averaging over all the possible states of γe as
Pout(Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
Fγb
(
2Rsγe + 2
Rs − 1) fγe(γe) dγe. (8)
3Regarding (7), it is clear that the condition for secrecy
is γb > γeq, where γeq is obtained from γe as γeq =
2Rsγe + 2
Rs − 1. Geometrically, the outage probability is
therefore given by the common area under the probability
density functions (PDFs) of γb and γeq, being the latter a
reescaled and shifted version of fγe(γe) of the form
fγeq(γeq) = 2
−Rsfγe(2
−Rs(γeq + 1)− 1). (9)
Thus, if we consider any fading distribution arising from
the CLT assumption as in (6), the PDFs of the SNRs – or,
equivalently, those of ‖h‖2 – are supported on a semi-infinite
interval, and then the tails of fγb(γb) and fγeq(γeq) overlap
regardless of the values of Rs and the average SNRs. Hence,
the condition of γb < γeq is met with non-null probability
and perfect secrecy cannot be achieved, as stated in [1–3, 19].
This can be observed in Fig. 1a, where even for Rs = 0 there
exists some outage area.
However, things are different when assuming ray-based
fading models. Due to the consideration of a finite number of
waves, there is a maximum and a minimum value for both the
channel gains and the instantaneous SNRs, i.e., the PDFs of γb
and γeq are supported on a bounded interval, say [γmin, γmax].
These limit values will depend on the relative amplitudes of the
incident waves, that will add-up destructively/constructively
with some probability. Therefore, it is evident that in some
cases the distribution domains will be disjoint, and hence the
OPSC can be identically zero, as showed in Fig. 1b. This
is an important observation, since it will allow us to achieve
perfect secrecy for transmission rates Rs > 0 without Eve’s
CSI knowledge at the transmitter. In the next subsection we
formalize this observation and give the condition to achieve
perfect secrecy over ray-based fading channels.
B. Achieving perfect secrecy over ray-based fading channels
Let us consider that the gains for both Eve’s and Bob’s
channels are given by (4), and assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that Vi ≥ Vj ∀ i < j. It is clear that the maximum
value of hk, with k = b, e denoting indistinctly Bob’s and
Eve’s gains, is obtained when all the waves in (4) are summed
coherently. In turn, the minimum value arises when destructive
combination occurs. Consequently, and in stark contrast with
classical fading distributions, the domain of ‖hk‖ is bounded
on the interval [‖hmink ‖, ‖hmaxk ‖] with
‖hmink ‖ =
[
V1,k −
Nk∑
i=2
Vi,k
]+
, ‖hmaxk ‖ =
Nk∑
i=1
Vi,k. (10)
Therefore, this finite domain definition of channel gains
allows us to achieve zero OPSC when a certain condition is
met, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider hb and he as in (4). Then, for a given
transmission rate Rs > 0, perfect secrecy, i.e., Pout(Rs) = 0,
is achieved if
γminb > 2
Rsγmaxe + 2
Rs − 1, (11)
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(a) γb and γeq follow a fading distribution (Rician) arising from CLT.
4 6 8 10 12 14
0
0.5
1
Pout(0.5) = 0
Pout(1)
fγeq (γeq)|Rs=0.5 fγeq (γeq)|Rs=1
fγb (γb)
γb,γeq(dB)
(b) γb and γeq follow a ray-based fading distribution.
Fig. 1. Graphical definition of the OPSC as the common area under the PDFs
of γb and γeq for classical and ray-based fading models, and different values
of Rs (γb = 12 dB and γe = 5 dB). For better visualization, the PDFs in
the figure have been normalized.
where γminb and γ
max
e are given by
γminb = γb
‖hminb ‖2
E[‖hb‖2] , γ
max
e = γe
‖hmaxe ‖2
E[‖he‖2] (12)
with ‖hminb ‖ and ‖hmaxe ‖ as in (10) and
E[‖hk‖2] =
Nk∑
i=1
V 2i,k, k = b, e. (13)
Proof: The condition for zero OPSC is given by γminb >
γmaxeq . Since γeq is obtained as a linear transformation over
γe, its maximum value occurs when γe = γmaxe , yielding
immediately (11). On the other hand, (13) is obtained by
calculating the expectation of the squared modulus of (4) and
applying the multinomial theorem.
Inspecting (11), we observe that higher values of Rs imply
a more restrictive perfect secrecy condition, i.e., if we aim
to increase the transmission rate we need γminb to be larger.
This is also shown in Fig. 1, where increasing Rs shifts fγeq
to the right regardless of the considered fading distribution.
Moreover, as γb becomes larger – or, equivalently, γe takes
lower values – we can transmit at a faster secure rate while
keeping zero OPSC, which is a coherent result.
4We also observe that considering a larger number of rays
in (4) has a significant impact in the OPSC. As N increases,
either in Bob’s or Eve’s channel, the interval [hmink , h
max
k ] gets
wider, causing the condition in (11) to be more restrictive.
In fact, if N → ∞, then (4) becomes (6), implying that
‖hmink ‖ → 0 and ‖hmaxk ‖ → ∞, as predicted by CLT-based
channel modeling approaches.
It is important to note that, although Eve’s instantaneous
CSI is not required, we implicitly assume that the distribution
of he is known, i.e., the value of γmaxe , in order to apply the
secrecy condition in (11). Because the relative amplitudes of
the waves arriving at Eve as well as their average power are
closely related to the geometry of the scenario under analysis,
this is equivalent to assume that Alice has information over
the propagation environment – or similarly, that is has some
sort of statistical knowledge of Eve’s CSI.
IV. SECURE TX OVER TWO-WAVE FADING
After formulating the conditions on which perfect secrecy
can be attained when considering ray-based fading channels,
we now analyze a simple albeit rather illustrative case by
assuming two dominant components arriving at both receiver
ends. The two-wave (or two ray) fading model [10, 20] arises
when setting N = 2 in (4), i.e.
h = V1e
jφ1 + V2e
jφ2 . (14)
This model is completely characterized by the parameter
∆ =
2V1V2
V 21 + V
2
2
, (15)
which measures the relative difference in amplitude between
the two waves. Hence, ∆ = 1 implies that both rays have
exactly the same power, whilst ∆ = 0 signifies that one of the
specular components in (14) vanishes.
With this consideration, the PDF and the CDF of the SNR
at Bob and Eve are written as [10, 21]
fγk(γk) =
1
piγk
√
∆2k − (1− γk/γk)2
(16)
γmink ≤ γk ≤ γmaxk ,
Fγk(γk) =
1
2
− 1
pi
asin
(
1− γk/γk
∆k
)
(17)
where, as in the previous section, the subindex k = b, e
is used to distinguish between the parameters of Bob’s and
Eve’s channel distributions. The domain boundaries for each
distribution are calculated as in (12), yielding in this case
γmink = γk(1−∆k), γmaxk = γk(1 + ∆k), (18)
and therefore the condition for perfect secrecy stated in
Proposition 1 is expressed as
γb >
2Rsγe(1 + ∆e) + 2
Rs − 1
1−∆b . (19)
Thus, despite the fact that Eve’s instantaneous CSI is un-
kown at Alice, secrecy in the communication can be ensured if
the average SNR at Bob is above this threshold. This condition
can be met, e.g., by a proper design of the distance between
the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, as well as by the
definition of secure zones on which no eavesdroppers can be
placed. After simple manipulations to (19), the largest constant
rate that ensures perfect secrecy is expressed as
Rmaxs =
[
log
(
γb(1−∆b) + 1
γe(1 + ∆e) + 1
)]+
. (20)
In fact, whenever Alice has perfect knowledge of Bob’s CSI
(instead of statistical knowledge only), it is possible to adapt
its transmission rate to Bob’s instantaneous CSI while meeting
the condition γb > γe(1 + ∆e), which yields the following
expression for the instantaneous secrecy capacity:
Cs =
[
log
(
γb + 1
γe(1 + ∆e) + 1
)]+
≥ Rmaxs . (21)
The OPSC over two-wave fading is straightforwardly cal-
culated by introducing (16) and (17) in (8), leading to
Pout(Rs) =
1
piγe
∫ γmaxe
γmine
F̂γb
(
2Rsγe + 2
Rs − 1)√
∆2e − (1− γe)/γe
dγe (22)
with
F̂γb(γ) =

0, if γ < γminb
1
2
− 1
pi
asin
(
1− γ/γb
∆b
)
, if γminb < γ < γ
max
b
1, if γ > γminb
,
(23)
where the piecewise definition of F̂γb(γ) is consequence of
the finite domain of Fγb(γb) in (17).
The outage probability in (22) in terms of Rs and γb
is depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. For the sake of
comparison, Pout over CLT based channels (in this case,
Rayleigh fading) is also shown as a reference. We observe
that, for a given Rs < Rmaxs , the outage probability is
exactly zero when considering a finite number of reflections,
whilst this behavior is not reproduced when assuming a fading
model arising from the CLT. Specifically, we observe that the
asymptotic decay for the Rayleigh case is that of a diversity
order equal to one. Conversely, when considering the ray-
based alternatives here analyzed the OPSC abrutly drops for
the limit value of γb given by (18), which can be regarded as
an infinite diversity order.
We also notice that the parameter ∆ plays an important
role in the OPSC; as ∆k increases, i.e., the power of the rays
becomes more similar in either Bob’s or Eve’s channels, Rmaxs
takes lower values. Then, larger values of ∆ render a lower
achievable transmission rate or, equivalently, require higher
values of the average SNR at Bob for the same Rs. It is
interesting to pay attention to the limit values of both ∆e
and ∆b. While setting ∆e = 1 still allows to achieve perfect
secrecy, substituting ∆b = 1 in (20) makes Rmaxs = 0. In the
next section, we will see that such restriction vanishes when
considering an alternative formulation of OPSC.
V. SECURE AND RELIABLE TX OVER TWO-RAY FADING
Up to this point, we have considered the classical definition
of OPSC given in (3). However, this formulation does not
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Fig. 2. Impact of CLT based fading models (Rayleigh) and ray-based ones
(Two-wave) in the OPSC for different values of channel parameters and
average SNRs. For all traces, γe = 0 dB.
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Fig. 3. OPSC in terms of γb for different values of channel parameters and
distinct fading models. For all traces γe = 7 dB.
distinguish between outage events produced by a failure in
achieving perfect secrecy (Rs > Cs) or due to the fact that
Bob cannot decode the transmitted message (e.g., because its
instantaneous SNR drops below the minimum value required
for a reliable communication) [19]. Therefore, we revisit the
outage formulation in [19, Sec. III], according to which the
OPSC is defined as
Pout(Rs) , P {Rs > Cb − Ce | γb > γth} (24)
where γth ≥ 0 is the minimum SNR at Bob required for a
reliable communication. Because Bob is supposed to collab-
orate with Alice, then the latter can suspend the transmission
if γb < γth, since it would make no sense transmitting when
the legitimate receiver cannot decode the message. With the
OPSC definition in (3), this situation would produce an outage
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Fig. 4. Comparison between classical and alternative OPSC formulation for
different values of channel parameters and distinct SNR thresholds. For all
traces, γe = 0 dB and ∆e = 0.6.
but, in fact, secrecy is not compromised since there would not
be any message transmission.
Therefore, introducing (2) in (24), Pout is rewritten as
Pout(Rs) =
P
{
γth < γb < 2
Rsγe + 2
Rs − 1}
P{γb > γth} , (25)
which, after some algebraic manipulations, leads to (27),
placed at the top of next page. We can observe that, if γth = 0,
then (25) becomes (7), since we eliminate any reliability
constraint.
Consider again the case of a finite number of reflections
arriving to the receiver, i.e., the channel gains follow a ray-
based distribution as in (4). Coming back to the geometrical
meaning of the OPSC, conditioning Pout to the transmission
event is equivalent to truncating the left tail of fγb(γb) in
Fig. 1. Hence, the perfect secrecy condition is now formulated
as
max{γminb , γth} > 2Rsγmaxe + 2Rs − 1, (26)
with γminb and γ
max
e given in (12). Note that the condition
is less restrictive than that in Proposition 1, allowing us to
achieve perfect secrecy in those scenarios where γminb takes
lower values, i.e., γminb → 0. Thus, by properly choosing γth,
it is possible to ensure secrecy at the expense of a lower
transmission probability, which ultimately translates into a
reduced throughput.
This is represented in Fig. 4, where the classical (3) and
the alternative (24) definitions of OPSC are compared. The
channels gains are assumed to follow a two-wave distribution,
and therefore Pout is calculated by substituting (16) and (17) in
(27) and taking into account the boundaries of Fγk(γk). Let us
first consider the case on which γb = 7 dB and ∆b = 0.4. We
observe that, until Rs reaches a certain value, γth < γminb and
thus the transmission condition has no impact on the OPSC,
since it is always met. Naturally, as the threshold increases,
such limit value for Rs is reduced.
6Pout(Rs) =
1
1− Fγb(γth)
[∫ ∞[
γth+1
2Rs
−1
]+ Fγb (2Rsγe + 2Rs − 1) fγe(γe) dγe
]
− Fγb(γth)
(
1− Fγe
(
γth+1
2Rs
− 1))
1− Fγb(γth)
. (27)
Regard now the case with γb = 10 dB and ∆b = 1. As
stated before, by choosing a sufficiently large threshold value
γth, we can ensure perfect secrecy even when ∆b = 1 (or,
equivalently, γminb = 0). However, increasing γth implies a
lower throughput, given by η = P{γb > γth}Rs.
VI. IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF SCATTERERS
In the previous sections, we have assumed a two-wave
distribution for both Bob’s and Eve’s channel, i.e., N = 2
in (4). Due to the clear impact of N in the perfect secrecy
condition stated in Proposition 1, we are now interested in
analyzing the consequences of having a larger number of
reflections arriving at the receiver. Specifically, two theoretical
scenarios are considered: (i) fixed average receive power and
different number of scatterers and (ii) number of scatterers as
a design parameter.
A. Fixed γ and different N
In this situation, an increased number of reflectors and
scatterers renders a richer multipath propagation and, con-
sequently, larger values of both Nb and Ne, with Nb and
Ne denoting the number of rays in (4) for Bob’s and Eve’s
channels, respectively. Hence, for some given γb and γe, our
goal is to determine the what extent the consideration of a
larger Nb and Ne impacts the secrecy performance. Since
the limit case of {Nb, Ne} → ∞ reduces to the Rayleigh
fading case, we expect that the perfect secrecy condition
in Proposition 1 is not met beyond some limit values of
{Nb, Ne}.
We now express hb and he as
hk = V1,ke
jφ1,k +
Nk∑
i=2
Vi,ke
jφi,k , k = e, b. (28)
with the amplitudes of the rays given by Vi,k = αi,kV1,k for
i = 2, . . . , Nk, with 0 < αi,k < 1 and αi,k ≥ αj,k, ∀ i <
j; i.e., the amplitude of the successive rays is expressed as
relative to the amplitude of the dominant component.
For simplicity, and to better visualize the impact of increas-
ing N , we consider again the classical outage formulation in
(7). Therefore, it is clear that increasing the number of waves at
reception makes the secrecy condition more restrictive. On the
one hand, if Nb increases, then γminb , which directly depends
on ‖hminb ‖ in (10), takes lower values. On the other hand,
γmaxe also rises with Ne.
The effect of increasing the number of rays is studied in
Fig. 5, where the OPSC is evaluated for different values of
N = Nb = Ne. We also set αi,k = α, which can be regarded
as a worst case situation in terms of secrecy performance. Due
to the mathematical complexity of the PDF of the ray-based
model in (4) when N > 3, which involves the integral of
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Fig. 5. Impact of increasing the number of waves at both Eve and Bob. hb
and he are distributed according to (28) with α = 0.2 for Rs = 0.5 and
α = 0.25 for Rs = 3. Also, Nb = Ne = N .
multiple Bessel’s functions [22], we resort on Monte Carlo
simulations for this section.
We observe in Fig. 5 that considering a larger number of
waves requires higher values of γb to achieve the same outage
probability, for a fixed Rs. Moreover, the average SNR at
Bob needed to ensure perfect secrecy also changes with N ,
which is a coherent result since we are both reducing the value
of γminb and increasing γ
max
e . Note that the relation between
the amplitudes Vi also plays a key role on achieving perfect
secrecy. For instance, in the case Rs = 3, in which α = 0.25,
we cannot ensure a secure transmission for N = 5, in contrast
to the case Rs = 0.5 and α = 0.2. This is explained as follows:
since we need γminb > γ
max
e , this translates into
V1,b −
Nb∑
i=2
Vi,b > 0. (29)
Thus, considering the relation between amplitudes as in
(28), we have that α(Nb − 1) < 1. Hence, if α = 0.25 and
N = 5, the condition is not met and therefore no perfect
secrecy can be ensured in this case.
B. Designing N for secrecy
Let us now move onto the second scenario, on which we
assume that we are able to control the number of waves
arriving at the receiver ends, i.e., we can somehow eliminate
some of the rays by a proper design of the propagation
characteristics of the environment. This has, obviously, a
non-negligible impact on the receiver power, since we are
disregarding some components of the channel and hence
7diminishing its average power. This approach seems desirable
for the eavesdropper channel, in the sense that it degrades its
average SNR. However, as we will later see, this also turns out
being beneficial for the legitimate channel despite the effective
decrease on the average SNR at Bob. For this reason, we will
specialize our study on the consideration of a fixed number of
rays for the eavesdropper channel, and a successive reduction
on the number of rays received by Bob.
In order to characterize the SNR loss incurred by Bob, we
consider the SNRs at both Bob and Eve given by
γb = γb
‖hb‖2
Ω
, γe = γe
‖he‖2
Ω
, (30)
where he and hb are given as in (4) with Ne = N and
Nb < N , representing the reduced number of waves arriving
at Bob. The power loss is characterized by normalizing both
channels by2 Ω =
∑N
i=1 V
2
i . Thus, E[‖hb‖2]/Ω < 1, which is
equivalent to scale γb by a factor E[‖hb‖2]/Ω = Ωb/Ω.
With this consideration, the OPSC is plotted in Fig. 6 for
different values of Nb but maintaining the number of waves at
Eve. For the sake of comparison, we also include the case of
the first scenario in which Nb = Ne and Ωb = Ω and the case
Ωb = Ω but Nb < Ne. We observe that, despite the fact that
Bob’s average SNR is lowered, having a reduced number of
waves arriving at Bob is beneficial from a secrecy perspective.
Note that the impact of eliminating rays on the legitimate
channel (and therefore having a lower received power) is less
detrimental as Nb approaches Ne. In fact, considering hk as
in (28) with αi,k = α ∀ i and k = b, e, the power loss can be
written as
Ωb
Ω
=
1 + α2(Nb − 1)
1 + α2(Ne − 1) . (31)
Then, from (31), it is clear that such loss reduces as Nb
increases, being equal to one if Nb = Ne, i.e., if we do not
eliminate any ray.
Finally, we also note that the most favorable case is that
where both Bob and Eve receive a small number of waves,
which confirms the beneficial role of a reduced number of
scatterers for wireless physical layer security.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we provided a new look at wireless physical
layer security, backing off from the classical CLT assumption
associated to fading and explicitly accounting for the effect of
considering a finite number of multipath waves arriving the
receiver ends. To the best of our knowledge, we showed for
the first time that it is possible to achieve perfect secrecy even
when the eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is unknown at the
transmitter.
We also showed that a rich multipath propagation has
a negative impact on the OPSC, so that those propagation
conditions which imply a reduced number of waves arriving at
the receiver ends are instrumental to achieving perfect secrecy.
This somehow contradicts the common knowledge that fading
is beneficial for physical layer security; this assert is restricted
to those situations on which the legitimate channel is more
2Note that we are assuming Vi,b = Vi,e ∀ i.
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Fig. 6. Impact of controlling the number of waves arriving at Bob. The wave
amplitudes relation is given by (28) with αi,k = α = 0.2. The case with
power loss is compared with the theoretical case in which Ωb = Ω and with
that where Ne = Nb. For all the traces Rs has been fixed to Rs = 1.
degraded that the eavesdropper’s counterpart (and hence PLS
is not possible in such case in the absence of fading), or when
Eve’s instantaneous CSI is available at Alice.
The consideration of a strong dominant specular component
(i.e. larger than the remaining aggregate waves) is the key
factor to enable perfect secrecy. Besides, incorporating a reli-
ability constraint in the OPSC definition allows for improving
the secrecy performance.
Finally, we also pointed out that the ability of controlling
the propagation environment in order to reduce the number of
waves arriving at the legitimate receiver is also beneficial for
physical layer security. This opens up the possibility of using
LIS to improve secrecy in a complete different way as those
suggested in the literature, i.e., to eliminate reflections instead
of for maximizing the SNR at Bob [23].
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